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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case presents the question of whether a person who is mentally ill and possibly
homeless, but not posing a danger of physical harm to himself or others or committing any
crime, may lawfully be taken into involuntary "protective custody" and searched by a police
officer, consistent with the person's Fourth Amendment rights. In this case, Gregory Towner
was convicted of possessing methamphetamine based on evidence discovered after an officer
handcuffed him and searched his person, against Mr. Towner's will, with the intention of taking
Mr. Towner to a hospital for mental health evaluation and potential commitment. The district
court concluded the officer's actions were constitutionally reasonable as part of the officer's
"community caretaking function," and for that reason the court denied Mr. Towner's motion to
suppress the evidence. In so ruling, the district court ignored the statutory requirements that
must be met before an officer is authorized to take a person into mental health protective
custody; specifically, that an officer must have a reason to believe the person either is gravely
disabled due to mental illness, or poses an imminent danger to himself or others. See Idaho Code
§ 66-326.
On appeal, Mr. Towner argues that the district court erred in applying the community
caretaking function to justify the officer's warrantless seizure and search as constitutionally
reasonable. Mr. Towner argues that the officer's act of taking him into "protective custody"
cannot be justified as a lawful exercise of the officer's community caretaking function, because
that action was unauthorized, and unlawful, under the relevant protective custody statute,
specifically LC. §§ 66-326(1), 66-317. (Appellant's Br., pp.13-17.) Specifically, Mr. Towner
argues that Officer Johns' actions were unauthorized and unlawful because the relevant

1

protective custody statute allows an officer to take a person into protective custody only if the
officer has a reason to believe the person is either "gravely disabled due to mental illness," or
that he poses an "imminent danger" to himself or others, and because there is no evidence to
support such a belief in this case. (Appellant's Br., pp.13-17.)

He asserts that the district court

erred, as a matter of law, when it concluded there was no need to address the statute's
requirements in deciding to apply the community caretaking function in this case. (Appellant's
Br., pp.4, 12 n.4; see Tr., p.46, Ls.6-9.)

The evidence should have suppressed under the

exclusionary rule the fruit of the unconstitutional seizure.
Mr. Towner alternatively argues that the district court erred in ruling that the warrantless
search of his pockets was justified as an exercise of the officer's community caretaking function.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's preservation argument and
demonstrate that, contrary to the State's assertions, Mr. Towner's appellate argument regarding
requirements of the mental health detention statute, Idaho Code§ 66-326, is not waived and is
properly before this Court.

Mr. Towner additionally addresses and corrects two inaccurate

assertions of fact.
The State's remaining arguments are unremarkable, and Mr. Towner respectfully refers
this Court to his Appellant's Brief as his reply.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Towner's Appellant's Brief and are not repeated here.

However, Mr. Towner wishes to

respond to two inaccuracies in the State's statement of facts.

1.

The Court Made No Finding, And There Is No Evidence, That Officer Johns
Knew Mr. Towner Had A Prior History Of Drug Use
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Contrary to the State's factual assertion (Resp. Br., p.1 ), there is no evidence or judicial
finding that Officer Johns "knew that Towner had a history" of "drug use" when he encountered
Mr. Towner.

Officer Johns did testify that he recognized Mr. Towner from unspecified

"previous experiences" and that he had "prior knowledge that Mr. Towner does have mental
health issues." (Tr., p.17, Ls.11-12.) However, there is no fmding of fact or evidence in the
record indicating that Officer Johns possessed knowledge that Mr. Towner had a history of drug
use. (See generally Tr., p.42, L.1 - p.45, L.16.)
2.

Mr. Towner Did Not Confirm He "Needed" To Go To The Hospital Or That
Hospitalization Was "Necessary"

Contrary to the State's factual assertions (Resp. Br., pp.I, 9), Mr. Towner never
confirmed he "needed" to go the hospital or that his hospitalization ''was necessary." Rather,
and more accurately, Mr. Towner had agreed, early on in the encounter, that being off his meds
was not a good idea, and that maybe he could go to the hospital and get back on them, and
agreed to go .. (See DefEx. A, 0:30-1:00.) Additionally, and as set forth in the Appellant's brief,
at pages 3, 12, and 20, it is undisputed that Mr. Towner subsequently changed his mind about
going to the hospital, and that at the time the officer handcuffed Mr. Towner and searched his
person, the officer knew Mr. Towner did not want to go to the hospital, but instead wanted to
go to his friend's house (Tr., p.26, Ls.7-17, p.29, Ls.15-22, Tr., p.35, L.1; Def.Ex.A, at 6:30).

3

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Towner's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Towner's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Towner asserts that the district court erred when it ignored the specific statutory

requirements that apply to determine whether an officer is authorized to take a person into
mental health protective custody. Specifically, before taking a person into custody, an officer
must have reason to believe the person is either "gravely disabled" due to mental illness," or else
poses an "imminent danger" to himself or others. See LC. §§ 66-326(1), 66-317. (Appellant's
Br., pp.9-17.)

He argues that because the evidence was insufficient to show he was gravely

disabled or else posed an imminent danger to himself or others, the officer was not authorized to
take Mr. Towner into mental health protective custody, the State failed to carry its burden to
justify the warrantless seizure of Mr. Towner as a constitutionally reasonable exercise of the
community caretaking function.

(Appellant's Br., pp.9-17.)

As demonstrated below, and

contrary to the State's assertion (Resp.Br., p.7), Mr. Towner's argument is preserved and is
properly before this Court.

B.

Mr. Towner's Argument - That The Officer's Caretaking Authority To Take Mr. Towner
Into Protective Custody Is Set Forth In The Statute And That The Officer Exceeded That
Authority - Is Preserved And Is Properly Before This Court
The State has asserted that Mr. Towner's appellate argument is not preserved because in

the district court, Mr. Towner did not cite LC. § 66-32~ (the section of the "Idaho Hospitalization
Of The Mentally Ill Act" that authorizes police to take persons into protective custody for mental
health evaluation) but instead cited LC. § 66-322 (which is the section of the Act that governs
commitment and judicial procedure), and the Act's definitions section, LC. § 66-317.
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(Resp.Br.,p.6.) As demonstrated below, the State's assertion is without merit and should be
rejected.
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently and repeatedly held that, "so long as the
substantive issue is properly preserved, a party's appellate argument may evo Ive on appeal.
State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 224 (2019). A party is permitted to "fine-tune its argument on

appeal where the issue was properly raised below and its position on that issue had not changed."
Id.

Specifically, a party may supplement the argument that it made in the lower court with

citation to relevant statutes dealing with the same subject. Id. (citing Ada Co. Hwy. Dist. v.
Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, 149 n.2 (2017).)

Mr. Towner's appellate argument fits

squarely within this Court's preservation requirements.
In the district court, the State conceded Mr. Towner ''was seized" when Officer Johns
placed him in handcuffs and "took him into protective custody," but claimed the warrantless
seizure and search of Mr. Towner were constitutionally reasonable to "facilitate the protective
custody hold and transport to the hospital," citing the community caretaking function. (R., p.60.)
At the suppression hearing, Officer Johns confirmed his particular caretaking "function" as
taking Mr. Towner into protective custody with the intention of transporting him to a hospital for
evaluation and a mental commitment. (Tr., p.22, Ls.12-19.) The officer further testified to his
role in the mental commitment process: "We take them to Kootenai Health, the E.R., first, and
then once at the E.R. a mental health professional comes and will make the determination
whether they can be released or taken to Kootenai Behavioral [Health]." (Tr., p.22, Ls.12-16.)
The officer went even further, confirming he had taken Mr. Towner into protective custody with
the intention that Mr. Towner "go to a mental commitment." (Tr., p.22, Ls.17-19.)

6

Regarding an officer's authority to take persons into mental health protective custody, the
officer testified he knew he was allowed to do so "if the person is a threat to themselves" or
others, or is "gravely disabled." (Tr., p.11, Ls.18-22, p.23, Ls.13-27.) Importantly, the officer
testified that the taking of persons into protective custody is done "pursuant to statute" and that
"the confines of that statute might delineate whether or not [the officer] can bring them into
protective custody." (Tr., p.23, Ls.17-22.) The officer testified that he believed Mr. Towner to
be a "threat to himself if he continued to have free reign, and so that's when I placed him
protective custody." (Tr., p.17, L.9-p.18, L.1.)
In his response to the State's evidence and argument on this issue,1 Mr. Towner took the
position that, contrary to the State's position, the community caretaking function did not apply
because the officer was not authorized under the applicable statute to take him into protective
custody. Specifically, Mr. Towner pointed to the officer's testimony that he had taken
Mr. Towner into custody "pursuant to statute" which required "a finding that [Mr. Towner was]
a danger to self, danger to others or gravely disabled." (Tr., p.39, Ls.1-5.) Mr. Towner also
cited provisions of the Idaho Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, and quoted the definitions in
Section 66-317, 2 for the terms, "likely to injury himself or others" and "gravely disabled."
(Tr., p.39, Ls.4-7.)
Based on this record, and notwithstanding an incorrect citation reference, it is clear that in
the district court, Mr. Towner took the position that (1) the officer's authority to take persons
into protective custody for transport and mental health evaluation and commitment was
1

The prosecutor also acknowledged that, in accordance with the officer's testimony, the
applicable standard for taking a person into protective custody to be the "threat of harm to self,
others" and "gravely disabled" standard, but argued the evidence met that standard. (See
Tr., p.35, Ls.16-19.)
2
Mr. Towner had also mistakenly cited Title 66-329, whereas Section 66-326 is the correct
citation for the statute that applies to the taking of persons into protective custody.
7

"pursuant to statute"; (2) the statute was the Idaho Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, (3)
under that statute, an officer needs to fmd that the person is "a danger to self, danger to others",
or "gravely disabled"; (4) there was not sufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Towner met
either of those threshold conditions; and for that reason (5) the officer "was not allowed to take

Mr. Towner into custody." (Tr., p.39, L.2 - p.41, L.12.) The district court had "the opportunity
to address" Mr. Towner's position, State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99 (2019), but explicitly
ruled that it did not need to do so in order to decide whether community caretaking function
applied in this case. (Tr., p.46, Ls.6-9.)
On appeal, Mr. Towner claims that the district court erred and he takes the same position
on appeal as he did in the district court. (Appellant's Br., pp.9-17.) However, and as permitted
under this Court's precedent, he has "fine-tuned" his argument, and supplemented that argument
with the correct citation for the statute, LC. § 66-326, "pursuant to which" an officer may
lawfully take persons into protective custody. (See Appellant's Br., pp.9-16.) Thus, the issue
and Mr. Towner's position on it were presented to the district court, and his argument is properly
before this Court for review in accordance with the controlling precedent. Hoskins, 165 Idaho at
224. The State's preservation argument fails and should be rejected.
C.

The State's Remaining Arguments Are Unremarkable And Mr. Towner Refers This
Court To His Appellant's Brief As His Arguments In Reply
The State's remaining arguments are unremarkable and Mr. Towner respectfully refers

this Court to the arguments in his Appellant's Brief as his arguments in reply.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in his Appellant's Brief, and those herein, this Court should
reverse the district court's order denying Mr. Towner's motion to suppress, vacate his judgment
of conviction, and remand his case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 19th day of August, 2020.

/ s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19th day of August, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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